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Abstract
Different matches on the same data may produce different treatment effect esti-
mates, even when they achieve similar balance or minimize the same loss function. We
discuss reasons and consequences of this problem. We present evidence of this prob-
lem by replicating ten papers that use matching. We introduce Matching Bounds: a
finite-sample, nonstochastic method that allows analysts to know whether a matched
sample that produces different results with the same levels of balance and overall match
quality could be obtained from their data. We apply Matching Bounds to a replication
of a matching study of the effects of foreign aid on civil conflict and find that results
could change based on the matched sample chosen.
Words: 9433.
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1 Introduction
Quantification and reduction of uncertainty surrounding empirical results is a central pillar
of political science, and of social science generally. Results accompanied by estimates of the
statistical and non-statistical uncertainty that surrounds them are more reliable, credible,
and lead to substantially stronger theoretical conclusions as well as better downstream policy
applications.
Despite the fact that the field specifically seeks to quantify (or eliminate) sources of
uncertainty that could influence results, there is a popular type of technique for which a
large amount of uncertainty goes unmeasured: matching. Matching is widely used in ap-
plied political science due to its ability to produce nonparametric treatment effect estimates
in an interpretable way, and many established empirical results have been obtained with
matching methods. In addition, recent years have seen a proliferation of different matching
methods (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Diamond and Sekhon, 2013; Iacus et al., 2012;
King et al., 2017), all of which have the same desirable features that any good matching pro-
cedure should have, and, importantly, produce similar levels of balance on the same data:
there is no clear way to choose one method over another. Choosing one method without tak-
ing others into account ignores the existence of potentially many good match assignments,
potentially leading to substantial unquantified uncertainty in the resulting estimates. One
might hope that the choice of matching method is innocuous – no matter which matching
method is used, as long as identification assumptions and balance constraints are satisfied
the conclusion is always the same, but as we will show, this is not true.
In this paper, we show that many nominally equivalent matching methods produce dif-
ferent treatment effect estimates and support different conclusions on the same datasets. We
demonstrate this by replicating papers that conduct their analysis with matching, and by
varying which matching method is employed. All the papers we replicated have appeared in
the American Journal of Political Science, and their results and conclusions are potentially
influential in policy-making. We argue that this issue is caused purely by the existence of
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many good match assignments among the data that produce similar balance (or otherwise
measured quality) but differ in the estimates they lead to. The fact that many equally-good
match assignments exist is due to inherent randomness in the data, implementation choices
and other researcher degrees of freedom inherent in the use of matching; all of these are
types of uncertainty that scientists typically would want quantified (but here, are not).
The issue of different estimates from equivalently good matches has been largely ignored
in the applied literature in political science: a survey of 100 papers appeared in Political
Science journals and using matching methods conducted by Miller (2015) shows that only
9 of these papers report results obtained with more than one matching method, and when
they do it is usually two. Virtually all of these studies make some reference to balance, or
use the fact that the matching method they employ achieves good balance to justify its use
alone (Miller, 2015).
To illuminate the uncertainty due to matching, we introduce Matching Bounds: a match-
ing algorithm that outputs sets of good matches spanning the entire range of treatment effect
estimates that could be produced by any reasonable analyst (where a reasonable analyst
works within a specific set of constraints). Using Matching Bounds, analysts will be able
to discover the largest and smallest treatment effect estimates that could be produced by
changing matching algorithm, which quantifies the uncertainty due to matching and thus
leads to more robust inferences and policy decisions. Simply stated, Matching Bounds makes
uncertainty stemming from choice of match assignment explicit and transparent.
Matching Bounds works by solving two mixed-integer programs that respectively max-
imize or minimize the value of an average treatment effect estimator on the same data by
changing only which units are matched with the constraints that the matches must produce
the same level of balance, both global and covariate-specific, and measured in a variety of
ways. In this way, Matching Bounds captures both statistical uncertainty and researcher-
degrees-of-freedom.
Matching Bounds can be particularly useful in fields in which the robustness of empirical
2
results is paramount: many studies in political economy and development economics have
gone on to inform the policy-making of major development agencies and state bureaucracies.
For example, Clayton (2015) uses matching to evaluate mandatory gender quotas in Lesotho,
Zucco (2013) shows that a conditional cash transfer intervention impacts electoral outcomes
using matching, and Buntaine (2015) uses the same methods to argue that civil society
organizations can hold international organizations such as the World Bank accountable to
national authorities. All of these studies, whose data were used in our experiments, have great
relevance for the policy world and for the allocation and procurement of development funds,
therefore, it is important that more robust matching methods are developed to strengthen
the results presented by studies such as these. The method proposed in this paper is one
such robust approach.
In this work, we apply Matching Bounds to the problem of estimating the effects of foreign
aid on conflict, which is of theoretical relevance both in political economy and international
relations, but also of practical importance as it directly impact how aid funds are allocated.
We apply Matching Bounds to a replication of Nielsen et al. (2011). We show that results
are robust to choice of matching method under strict balance restrictions, but if balance is
constrained in a slightly different way, results can vary quite dramatically. We take advantage
of the interpretability of matching to explain what causes the issue in an application.
The paper will proceed as follows: First we explain why matches of similar quality can
lead to different results. Then we provide empirical evidence that this occurs in practice:
we replicate the analyses of ten prominent papers and show that their results may change
if we switch from one popular matching method to another. Second, we introduce the
Matching Bounds algorithm that computes the range of sample average treatment effects
over reasonable match assignments. Finally, we apply Matching Bounds to the problem of
estimating the effects of foreign aid on conflict by reproducing and expanding the analysis
of Nielsen et al. (2011).
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1.1 Matching Methods for Observational Inference: Definitions,
Notations and Assumptions
We have a sample D = {(yi, ti,xi)}Ni=1 of N units, that we wish to study under a binary treat-
ment, t. We measure an outcome variable of interest, yi for each unit in the sample, as well
as a vector of P covariates, xi = (xi1, . . . , xiP ) ∈ RP , with the corresponding N × P matrix
of covariates denoted by X. We will most often refer to the two groups of units separately,
denoting the treatment group with {(xti, yti)}Nti=1 and the control group with {(xcj, ycj)}Ncj=1,
where N t is the number of units that have received the treatment and N c is the number of
units that are in the control group.
In a common causal inference setting, we wish to estimate a treatment effect for each
unit: τi = Yi(1) − Yi(0), where Yi(1) and Yi(0) are unit i’s potential outcomes, namely, the
values of Y obtained under two different treatments. Unfortunately, we only ever observe one
of the two potential outcomes for each unit and never the other, which we must impute using
data observed from other units. A matching algorithm is a procedure for selecting which
units we should use as a substitute for each unit’s unobserved outcome (counterfactual).
Formally, we define match as a matrix, W ∈ RNt×Nc , such that every entry obeys
0 ≤ wij ≤ U , for some positive constant, U , a generic upper bound preventing units from
being matched an infinite amount of times.1 If wij > 0, then units i and j are matched and
are thought to represent at least part of each other’s counterfactual outcome. The different
types of matches that have been suggested in the literature can be obtained by constraining
W in different ways.2 A matching method is a function: A : D 7→ W , where D is the domain
we draw the data from and W is the set of all possible matrices of matches. A matching
1This is a very general requirement: units could be matched to each other up to U times, for example.
All existing integer matching methods require U = 1, and non-integer weighting methods require U <∞.
2For example: if we want one-to-one matching we require:
∑Nt
i=1 wij = 1,
∑Nc
j=1 wij = 1, wij ∈ {0, 1} for
all i, j; if we instead want to allow multiple control units to be matched with the same treatment unit but
no control unit can be matched more than once we require: wij ∈ {0, 1} and
∑Nt
i wij = 1 for j = 1, . . . , Nc.
Another example: synthetic control matching (Abadie et al., 2010) tries to average multiple control units
to create a synthetic match for each treatment unit and can be obtained by requiring:
∑Nc
j=1 wij = 1 and
wij ∈ [0, 1] for all i and j.
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method is a tells us, given the data, what matches we should make with the units. In this
article we focus on integer matching with and without replacement: a single unit can be
matched to one or more whole other units: we do so because we wish to study the problem
of matching specifically, instead of weighted estimation more in general.3
We make the common assumptions of observational inference,4 as well as some statistical
assumptions on the population distributions of the potential outcomes and treatment allo-
cation. These latter assumptions are quite significant as we will show that the distinction
between a finite-sample and super-population view of causal inference (Imai et al., 2008)
play a role in defining and formalizing the problem at hand. For all units, i, we assume:
Assumption 1. (Common Support) 0 < Pr(Ti = 1|Xi) < 1
Assumption 2. (Random Sample) (Yi(t), Ti, Xi)
iid∼ f(Yi(t), Ti, Xi)
Assumption 3. (Conditional Ignorability) Yi(1), Yi(0) ⊥ Ti|Xi
The first assumption requires all units to have a positive probability of being treated or
untreated. The second assumption states that there is a well-defined population distribution
for treatment, outcomes and covariates and that all units are drawn independently from
it (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Note that, formulated in this way, this assumption also
indirectly requires the common SUTVA (Rubin, 1976), i.e., the absence of hidden treatments
and the independence of units’s outcomes from other unit’s treatment assignments. The
last assumption is the common requirement of observational inference, that all potential
confounders of the causal relationship between T and Y are measured (Imbens and Rubin,
2015; Pearl, 2009). Throughout most of the paper, we will be concerned with the problem of
3While all matching estimators are weighting estimators (Imbens and Rubin, 2015), the problem of
matching consists of having to form pairs of units that are comparable on all covariates except the treatment
assignment. This creates a different problem than generating a set of balancing weights, and as such we
focus on integer matching alone.
4Matching can also be used as a tool for blocking before randomization: Pairs of similar units are matched
and treatment is then randomly assigned to one unit within each pair. This usage of matching is theoreti-
cally different than the one this paper is concerned with, as in this case treatment assignment is assuredly
independent of the matching covariates, and therefore treatment effects can be estimated unbiasedly, inde-
pendently of how the matches are made. The issues brought up in this paper are specific only to matching
done after treatment, and as a way to ensure ignorability of treatment assignment.
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estimating the Sample Average Treated Effect on the Treated (SATT) under the assumption
above. This quantity is defined as follows:
τ =
1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
E[Y ti (1)− Y ti (0)|Ti = 1, Xi = xi]. (1)
This is a common quantity of interest in causal inference and we choose to estimate it with
the common difference-in-means matching estimator, defined for some match assignment W
as: (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983):
τˆ =
1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
yti −
1
N t
Nc∑
j=1
ycjwij. (2)
2 How and Why Changing Matching Methods Changes
Treatment Effect Estimates
Consider the problem of having to estimate the treatment effect for one treated unit, i by
pair matching. whose non-random potential outcomes are Yi(1) = 1 and and Yi(0) = 0. We
observe Yi(1) but not Yi(0) so we use matching to create a proxy for it. We can choose to
match i to either of two untreated units: j or k, both having observed xj = xk = xi but
differing in their observed outcome values: yj(0) = 0 and yk(0) = −1. If we chose to match i
to j we would obtain the correct estimate, but we would overestimate τi if we were to match
i to k, or if we were to average j and k to construct a match for i. Obviously since we never
observe Yi(0) we never know which of the matches will lead to the most accurate estimate.
The problem is that the two matches are equivalent in terms of X and, consequently, we
have no way of telling which one is better.
More in general, analysts are often interested in estimating an average causal effect with
matched data that satisfies some pre-defined balance requirement. Consider the problem
of having to match M units, that is, find W, such that aggregate balance between the
6
treated and control sample is either below or equal to some level B (which could also be
the minimum achievable value in the data), as measured by a difference in means between
treated and control groups, for each covariate, p:
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
Nc∑
i=1
(WTXtp)i −
1
M
Nt∑
i=1
(WXcp)i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ B; (3)
we would like to solve for W, but this is a system of inequalities in N t × N c unknown
integer variables, with the additional constraint that the entries of W have to add up to M :
there is no easy way to even know whether it will have a unique solution for this specific set
of covariates (Papadimitriou, 1984; Valiant and Vazirani, 1986), let alone a way to devise
balance constraints that ensure uniqueness of the solution of the system for an arbitrary
dataset. Depending on the values of Xt and Xc, B and on the additional constraints that
we impose on W, there may be several different values of W that solve the system above,
and thus achieve the desired balance or better, this would be true even if we were to replace
the inequality in (3) with strict equality. If we allow only one-to-one matches, or even one-
to-many in certain cases, different solutions will match the same treatment unit to different
control units, discarding a different sample of controls every time. The problem is that the
system above guarantees us balance at least B on the matching covariates, but says nothing
about the values of the dependent variable that the control units we match with will have.
It is important that the dependent variable never actually be used to make matches (Rubin,
1976), as this would equate with selecting cases on the dependent variable, which would
introduce confounding in the design.
2.1 Why This Happens
Statistical Reasons There are precise statistical reasons for why there might exist mul-
tiple sets of matches that lead to different treatment effect estimates. To study the most
general setting, suppose only assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We have a real-valued random
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outcome Y (t) = ft(x,u, ), where x represents the observed covariates, u is a vector of un-
observed covariates, and  is a real-valued scalar term denoting unrelated noise, such that
E[] = 0. Consider two match assignments Wa and Wb: we wish to estimate the SATT
with the estimator in (2). Let τˆa be the estimate of the SATT obtained with W
a and τˆ b
the estimate obtained with Wb. We can use a simple Taylor expansion to decompose the
difference between τˆa and τˆ b as:
τˆa − τˆ b = βT1 (x¯a − x¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observables
+βT2 (u¯
a − u¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unobservables
+ β3(¯
a − ¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Baseline
variance
(4)
+ difference of higher order terms,
where x¯a is the average value of observed covariates in matched sample a, u¯a is the average
value of unobserved covariates in matched sample a, ¯a is the average value of statistical
noise in matched sample a, and x¯b, u¯b, ¯b are analogously defined for matched sample b. See
the supplement for a full derivation and precise definition of all quantities. Focusing on the
lower order terms, we can get a clear picture of why the difference between τˆa and τˆ b could
be nonzero. Note that the decomposition in (4) should make it clear that there could be
different reasons why τˆa − τˆ b is nonzero.
First, there is the difference in the averages of observed covariates: (x¯a − x¯b). This
difference is 0 whenever both Wa and Wb lead to perfect mean balance, i.e., for some metric
‖ · ‖ on the space of x, we have: ‖x¯a − x¯t‖ = ‖x¯b − x¯t‖ = 0, where x¯t is the average of the
observed covariates among treated units. Note that when ‖x¯a− x¯t‖ = ‖x¯b− x¯t‖ 6= 0, it is not
necessarily true that x¯a = x¯b, and, therefore, the first term in (4) will not necessarily be 0.
This happens whenever the same level of mean balance, according to some pre-defined metric,
is achieved by balancing different sets of covariates. Note further that β1 is the optimal set of
weights that should be given to covariates when matching to optimize mean balance (but not
necessarily balance on higher moments), however, this quantity is not known. Knowledge of
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β1 would indeed allow to choose the optimal among many equivalent-balance matches.
The second term in (4) represents weighted difference in average unobservables between
the two matched control sets. This quantity is 0 under Assumption 3, or under the same
conditions on mean balance as we had for observables. Importantly, balance can never be
checked in this case because ua and ub are not observed. This suggests that the existence of
different sets of matches of equal balance on observables, but that produce different estimates,
could be an indicator of violation of Assumption 3.
Lastly, the final term in (4) is the difference between residual terms of outcome vari-
ables. This quantity is guaranteed to be 0 only if there is no randomness at all in the
outcomes, conditional on treatment and observed covariates, and under Assumption 3.
This is rarely the case, as outcomes are often sampled from a super-population of in-
terest. A simple upper bound on the expected absolute value of this term is given by√
V ar(Y¯ a|X,U) + V ar(Y¯ b|X,U):5 this indicates that when outcomes have large condi-
tional variance, then there is possibility that units with similar values of both observed and
unobserved covariates will still have different outcomes. Because of this, units with the same
covariate values could have different outcomes under Assumption 3 whenever observed co-
variates are not strongly predictive of outcomes: valid causal inference is still possible in
this case, thanks to ignorability, but there might exist multiple equally-balanced matched
sets that lead to different treatment estimates due to much of the outcome variance being
independent of the observed covariates. We note that these variances will decrease as the size
of the matched sample increases: this points to the bias-variance trade-off between matched
group size and balance, which has been studied, for example, in King et al. (2017).
Researcher degrees of freedom There is also one fundamental non-statistical factor
that influences the issue presented here: researcher degrees of freedom inherent in choice
of matching procedure and hyperparameter values associated with it (Gelman and Loken,
2013; Coker et al., 2018). There is often little to no guidance on how to choose either a
5See the supplement for a derivation.
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matching procedure or hyperparameter values. For example, the value of B in (3) has to be
chosen prior to analysis, or has to be adjudicated as sufficient if output by some optimization
algorithm. Moreover, different matching methods constrain the problem in (3) in different
ways, and analysts could choose to add or modify additional constraints on the problem.6
Added to the statistical issues just presented, this amount of choice that researchers have in
choosing and using matching method only adds to the uncertainty caused by the existence
of many good quality match assignments.
2.2 Consequences
Choosing the optimal-balance matches does not solve the problem. One impor-
tant consequence of all these factors is that optimizing a match quality function will not
solve the problem. This is because matched sets with similar quality but different average
outcomes might still exist in the data due to both the statistical reasons highlighted above,
and to researcher choice of optimization criteria, algorithms, and hyper-parameters. In par-
ticular, note that Assumption 3 being satisfied is not enough to guarantee the existence of
a single optimal set of matches, as the same level of covariate balance might be achieved in
different ways by different sets, and because of conditional variance as explained above.
Even if there were only one optimal-balance matched set on the specific data sample
observed, the argument that this and only this set should be chosen is fallacious as it is
predicated on the assumption that results that have exactly this balance should be trusted
and nothing else. Furthermore, the choice of this specific value of balance has no clear
justification. Had the analyst obtained a slightly different value of balance from a matched
set, for example on a different draw from the data distribution, this set would not have been
used for analysis. In this sense, choosing optimal balance is a strong assumption: a more
robust approach would be to consider matched sets that are below a theoretically-justified
threshold of quality.
6For example, by weighting covariates differently when assessing balance, or by requiring that certain
specific units always be matched, or by requiring a set amount of matches to be made.
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Different matching methods produce different treatment effect estimates. An-
other key consequence of the problem introduced before, and the main way in which it
affects reliability of results, is that different algorithms will choose between several different
equal-quality solutions differently from one another, and, in most cases, arbitrarily. This
will cause different matching algorithms applied to the same dataset to produce different
estimates. Obviously hyperparameter choice and the researcher-degrees-of-freedom that this
involves plays a fundamental role in why different matching methods would produce different
estimates, and it exasperates all the issues covered before. These often arbitrary choices have
a great impact on how and why different procedures lead to different results. Nonetheless,
the arguments made in this section should make it clear that even if we were to ignore the
issue of researcher choice, many different, good quality, matched groups could still exist, and
algorithms could be choosing among them in arbitrary ways. The observation that different
matching methods lead to different results is surprisingly scarce in the existing literature:
some existing work (Miller, 2015; Morucci et al., 2018) notices the problem and propose
tentative solutions, but do not provide empirical or simulated evaluation of its magnitude.
2.3 Empirical Evidence From Replicating the Analyses of 10 Pa-
pers
A consequence of the fact that many similar-quality matched groups exist is that different
matching methods should produce different estimates on the same data. We present empirical
evidence of this fact in this section. We show results from a replication study of ten papers
that appeared originally in the American Journal of Political Science after 2010. These
papers study a range of different topics but all have in common that they make use of
matching methods either for their primary hypothesis test or for a robustness check. The
papers replicated here were chosen to represent a broad array of different areas of inquiry
within political science: three are about topics in political economy and comparative politics,
four about American politics and the US party systems and institutions, and three about
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international relations and civil conflict. Within each subfield, papers were selected based
on two criteria: data size and availability and the extent to which matching was used within
the paper.
Crucially, all but one of the papers report results from only one single matching method,
thus ignoring the possibility that results might have been different had they chosen to do
their matches differently. Here we try to replicate as many of the hypothesis tests on the
paper’s primary treatment effect, reported by the authors. The existence of more than one
treatment effect is tested in each paper, and different outcome models are used to estimate
effects after matching. We try to replicate as many of the tests reported in each paper as
possible, changing estimands or outcome models as the authors do.
Unlike the original papers, we use 6 different matching methods and compare their results.
We compare matches made using Nearest Neighbor, Coarsened (Iacus et al., 2012), Optimal
(Rosenbaum, 1989), Genetic (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013) and Mixed Integer Matching
(Zubizarreta, 2012). We choose these algorithms because of their popularity in applied
research,7 and because there are large differences between how they choose which matches
to use among equivalently good ones or how they assess balance. While different, all of
these methods have been shown capable to achieve balance within their samples. Additional
information on how this replication was conducted is available in Section B of the Supporting
Information.
After creating a matched dataset with each of the six methods chosen, we apply the
exact estimation method used by the papers’ original authors on their matched data. This is
almost always a linear regression model, the coefficients of which are interpreted as treatment
effect estimates. Pre-estimation matching methods all target the SATT.
Results are reported in Figure 1: each row in the figure corresponds to a hypothesis test
(multiple HP tests are performed in each paper) and each column to a matching method,
7Of around 80 of the Political Science papers that make use of matching methods surveyed by Miller
(2015), 19 make use of CEM, 28 of Genetic Matching, and 38 Nearest Neighbor matching. Optimal and
MIP matching are less used in political science but are largely employed in biostatistics and epidemiology.
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and cells are color-coded based on the result: results that are positively significant at the
5% level are red, non-significant results are white, and negatively significant results at the
5% level are orange. If choice of matching algorithm did not influence results, we would see
rows colored uniformly, but this is hardly the case in the figure: clearly, different matching
methods produce different results. Figure 2 reports balance statistics for the same set of
matching methods in a similar way: cells are color coded according to what percentage of
covariates was balanced after matching with each method. Even though balance consistency
across matching methods does vary, its variation is not as large as that of the hypothesis test
results. In some cases, post-matching estimators fail to run on the matched data produced by
one of the methods:8 we denote this with a blue cell. We chose not to alter the post-matching
method in these cases to remain as close as possible to the authors’ original analysis.
At least one matching method that produces both a statistically significant result and
another that produces a non-significant result exists for about 90% of the replicated hy-
pothesis tests. This is of substantive importance because, while statistical significance is
not in itself an indicator of the substantive significance of the results, it is often a heuristic
employed to evaluate observational inference results. Moreover it is undeniable that pub-
lication bias favors statistically significant results, which will then have a wider readership
and potential impact. Further, for about 62% of the hypothesis tests conducted there is at
least one matching method that produces a positive treatment effect and one that produces
a negative one. Given that in most cases the methods achieve similar balance, this makes it
hard to discern even the direction of the treatment effect.
Our replication exercise shows that there is more uncertainty in empirical results produced
with matching methods than commonly thought. This additional uncertainty is caused by
choice of matching method, as evidenced by the data presented here.
8In most of these cases, regression models based on a numerical optimization method failed to converge
to a solution on the matched data.
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3 Quantifying Matching Uncertainty with Matching
Bounds.
In this section we introduce Matching Bounds: a method for attenuating the issues presented
before by making variation in treatment effect estimates due to matching explicit to the
analyst. We propose a set of algorithms aimed at computing the smallest and largest TE
estimates that could be obtained on a set of data by simply changing how the matches are
made subject to match quality constraints, such as balance or calipers. Integer programming
has already been used extensively for matching (Zubizarreta, 2012) and these algorithms
directly extend the existing methods to account for matching uncertainty.
First, we define Matching Bounds formally. Let C be a set of constraints on the quality of
the matches. These could be, for example, calipers, balance constraints or aggregate distance
constraints. Now let ΩC,D be the set of matches that satisfies all the constraints in C. The
matching upper and lower bound for a generic estimator, θˆ are:
W+ = arg max
W∈ΩC,D
θˆ(W, D), W− = arg min
W∈ΩC,D
θˆ(W, D). (5)
In words, these bounds are the largest and smallest estimates that could be obtained from
θˆ(W, D) by changing the matches within the constraint set. Using these matches, analysts
can compute θˆ(W+, D) and θˆ(W−, D), this will yield a fundamental piece of information:
the range of treatment effects that could be obtained on the same sample and with the same
level of balance by changing how matches are made. Knowing this information is important
for both scientific and policy purposes: In the first case, Matching Bounds allows analysts
to test scientific theories independently of the matched sample used. In the second case,
our proposed method can be used to bound average effects of policies also independently
of matched sample. Practically, Matching Bounds highlight the potential difference in es-
timated effects at the similar levels of match quality: if two matching algorithms produce
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similar levels of match quality, TE estimates they produce will lie between the bounds.
There are several other reasons why this approach is advisable. At a first glance, com-
puting all equally good matches and then averaging treatment effects over them seems like
a better solution than bounding the range of these effects, however it is not. Two reasons
are: first and most important, averaging estimates from different matches presumes that the
probability of choosing a specific assignment be known and uniform. Since this probability
depends both on choice of a matching method, and on the matching method’s choice of as-
signment, this quantity is very hard to know exactly. As previously stated, even if we knew
exactly Pr(W|A) the choice of matching method A can not be modeled probabilistically.
Second, even if this distribution was known we would have to adjust variance estimates for
the treatment effect in accordance, and most estimators used after matching do not account
for this variance, leading to biased variance estimation. Moreover, enumerating all possible
good matches is a computationally expensive problem, as it involves solving a, possibly very
large, sequence of increasingly complex integer programs, which is already quite computa-
tionally hard in itself.9
While the bounds above are defined as extrema of some function, they do not represent
outlying quantities: the constraints in C define the requirements that a good set of matches
should satisfy in order to be used in the analysis of D, and Matching Bounds are searched
only among those matches that satisfy these requirements. An analyst wanting to estimate
Matching Bounds for a dataset should choose these constraints based on the minimal re-
quirement for quality that she would want for the matches with any methodology. Matches
made at the bounds should be indistinguishable in terms of quality from any other good
set of matches. Even if there were no popular matching algorithms that produced the same
treatment effect as the Matching Bounds, it would still be important to know that at the
same level of match quality there existed matches that produced such different TE estimates.
9Another piece of information that might be of interest is be the number of equivalent matches: unfor-
tunately counting the number of elements of ΩC,D is equally as computationally expensive as enumerating
them, and, as such likely infeasible for most datasets (for a discussion of Rashomon sets, a concept related
to equivalent matches, see Fisher et al., 2018).
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One could envision a randomized matching algorithm choosing this match assignment with
some probability in any case.
3.1 Computing Matching Bounds for the SATT
We now outline computational strategies to obtain Matching Bounds for two different esti-
mands of interest under assumptions 1, 2, 3.
We would like to compute Matching Bounds for the SATT as defined in Eq. (1), and
estimated with the estimator in (2). If we constrain the number of matches to be exactly the
number of treated units, then we can compute Matching Bounds on the SATT by solving
the following integer program, letting y¯t = 1
Nt
∑Nt
i=1 y
t
i :
Formulation 1
min/max τˆ = y¯t − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ycjwij, (6a)
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (6b)
Nt∑
i=1
wij ≤ Kc, j = 1, . . . , N c (6c)
Nc∑
j=1
wij = 1, i = 1, . . . , N
t (6d)
W ∈ ΩC,D. (6e)
This integer program targets the treatment effect as its objective, and constrains matches
to be integer (6b), each each control unit to be matched at most Kc times (6c). One-to-one
matching is enforced by Constraint (6d). Finally, additional constraints in (6e) are specified
within set C, and ΩC,D is the set of all matches that satisfy the constraints in C on data D.
Examples of constraints such as balance or aggregate distance are given in Section 3.3. Note
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that Kc needs to be specified in such a way to allow for N t matches. If the pool of control
units is smaller than the pool of treated units, replacement must be possible in order for the
SATT to be estimable in this manner. In this case, each treatment unit is matched to one
control unit, but the same control unit can be used up to Kc times.
The formulation above allows analysts to compute Matching Bounds for the SATT under
one-to-one matching. This latter requirement can be too strict: indeed many popular match-
ing algorithms optimally choose the number of controls matched to each treated unit (Iacus
et al., 2012; Diamond and Sekhon, 2013; King et al., 2017) to maximize balance. For this
reason, we introduce a fractional integer program formulation with an unspecified number
of matches, that requires only a lower and upper bound for the total numbers of times each
unit can be used as a match:10
Formulation 2
max /min τˆ = y¯t − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ycjwij∑Nc
j=1 wij
. (7a)
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (7b)
Nt∑
i=1
wij ≤ Kc, j = 1, . . . , N c (7c)
Nc∑
j=1
wij ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , N t (7d)
W ∈ ΩC,D. (7e)
Note that when Kc = N t we have matching with full replacement, while Kt = 1 and
Kc = 1 define one-to-one matching. The formulation above requires solving a fractional
10Note that most existing matching methods either require users to choose the number of matched units
explicitly or assume that all units are matched and prune away units for which good matches do not exist
via calipers. Only requiring bounds on the number of times units can be matched makes this formulation
quite flexible in comparison.
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integer program twice, for this reason computing Matching Bounds might be too expensive
especially on larger datasets. Fortunately, it is possible to reformulate the problem above as
a simpler integer linear program by defining additional decision variables. We can apply the
Charnes-Cooper transformation (Charnes and Cooper, 1962) to the optimization problems
formulated to transform the fractional integer program above into an integer-linear program,
with guarantees on optimality of the solution and considerably reduced computation time
(Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, Sec. 4.3.2). This transformation can be accomplished by
introducing two auxiliary variables. For all i and j define:
vij =
wij∑Nc
j=1wij
and zi =
1∑Nc
j=1wij
. (8)
The variable z is the denominator in the objective function of Formulation 2, and the variable
uij is a fractional version of the binary indicator that determines whether unit i is matched
to unit j. With these new decision variables we can rewrite the problem as:
Formulation 3
min /max τˆ t = y¯t − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ycjvij (9a)
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subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, zi, vij ∈ R+ i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (9b)
vij ≤ zi, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (9c)
vij ≤ wij, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (9d)
vij ≥ zi − (1− wij), i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (9e)
Nc∑
j=1
vij = 1, i = 1, . . . , N
t (9f)
Nt∑
i=1
vij ≤ Kc
Nt∑
i=1
zi, j = 1, . . . , N
c (9g)
W ∈ C. (9h)
The objective is the usual difference in sums between treated and control units included
in the match. Constraint (9b) defines the domain of all the decision variables. Note that
the auxiliary variables just introduced can only have positive value. Constraints (9c), (9d),
(9e) define the role of the new transformed decision variables, uij: these variables represent
whether or not unit i is matched to j, but they are not valued one or zero, they are instead
forced to be either zero (by Constraint (9d), when wij = 0 or exactly z (Constraint (9e))
when wij = 1. The new matching indicators are fractions where the denominator is the
total of matched units, because of this they should sum up to one over all unit pairs: this
is enforced by Constraint (9f). Constraint (9g) forces each control unit to be used at most
times and Kc times respectively. C Additional match quality constraints are defined by (9h);
general formulas for conversion of constraints on wij to constraints on uij are available in
Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004). In Section 3.3 we provide transformed constraints for some
popular balance and match quality measures.
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3.2 Computing Matching Bounds for Same-Balance-Subsample
ATTs
Another quantity of interest is the range of treatment effects in subsamples of the data that
are equally balanced or, more generally, satisfy the same constraints. What we mean by this is
that, by allowing the exclusion or inclusion of certain treated units among matched samples,
we can find subsamples that aren’t fully representative of the whole treated sample, but that
are equally balanced between treated and control. There are several reasons why estimates
for these subsamples might be interesting to analysts, even if the covariate values considered
might not be entirely the same across subsamples: to understand treatment heterogeneity, or
as a way to fully characterize uncertainty around matching estimates. Indeed it might be the
case that subsamples that are very similar in terms of included covariate values lead to very
different TE estimates. In some other cases, analysts can only estimate a restricted version
of the SATT that doesn’t include all treated units (Iacus et al., 2012; King et al., 2017):
sub-sample Matching Bounds can be useful to characterize variation in matching estimates
due to selection of such a sub-sample. In general, knowledge of the range of TE estimates
between equally-good subsamples of the data should inform both empirical evaluation of
theoretical premises and policy decision-making based on empirical evaluation.
For a chosen set of matches, W, that satisfies the requirement that treated units are
not matched multiple times, but only either included or excluded in the sub-sample, i.e.,∑Nc
j=1 wij ≤ 1, we define the Sub-Sample Average Treatment Effect (sSATT) as:
τ s =
∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1 wijE[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi = xi]∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1wij
, (10)
again, the estimator of choice is a difference-in-means on the data matched by the chosen
21
W:
τˆ s =
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
(yti − ycj)wij∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1 wij
. (11)
We differentiate between computing bounds when the desired number of matches is pre-
specified by the user and when only lower and upper bounds are placed on the total number
of matches. Given a desired number of matches, M , lower and upper Matching Bounds can
be obtained for the sSATT by solving the following integer program:
Formulation 4:
max /min
1
M
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ytiwij −
1
M
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ycjwij, (12a)
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (12b)
Nt∑
i=1
wij ≤ Kc, j = 1, . . . , N c (12c)
Nc∑
j=1
wij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , N t (12d)
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wij = M, i = 1, . . . , N
t, j = 1, . . . , N c (12e)
W ∈ ΩC,D. (12f)
The formulation above is analogous as Formulation 1, except with two additional constraints:
(12d) forces treated units to only be used once, and (12e) defines the overall number of
matches, given by M . If the requirement to predetermine the exact number of matched
unit is too strict, a fractional integer program similar to the one in Formulation 2 can be
introduced to find Matching Bounds given only lower and upper bounds on the amount of
times each unit can be matched. We apply the same transformation as in Formulation 3 to
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linearize such problem. For all i and j define:
uij =
wij∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1wij
and z =
1∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1wij
, (13)
where z and u have the same meaning as in Formulation 3. With these new decision variables
we can write the problem of finding Matching Bounds for the sSATT with a variable number
of matches as:
Formulation 5
max /min
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ytiuij −
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
ycjuij, (14a)
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (14b)
uij ≤ z, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (14c)
uij ≤ wij, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (14d)
uij ≥ z − (1− wij), i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (14e)
uij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c (14f)
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
uij = 1, (14g)
Nc∑
j=1
uij ≤ z, i = 1, . . . , N t (14h)
Nt∑
i=1
uij ≤ Kc · z, j = 1, . . . , N c (14i)
z ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N t (14j)
W ∈ ΩC,D. (14k)
This formulation is symmetric to Formulation 3, and the constraints here serve the same
purposes as the corresponding ones in that formulation.
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The proposed optimization methods can be implemented with any of the popular Mixed-
Integer-Programming tools such as GLPK, CPLEX or Gurobi. In certain cases, linear relax-
ations can also be considered if the analyst is willing to forgo unitary matches for computation
time. More information on integer programming methods and tools is available in Boyd and
Vandenberghe (2004) and Winston et al. (2003).
3.3 Constraining the Quality of Matches.
Before Matching Bounds can be computed, it is necessary to define C, the set of quality
constraints that matches should satisfy to be acceptable. This will, in turn, restrict the
space of possible matches we can choose from to the set ΩC,D. As argued before, there
is no general proven set of criteria that matches should satisfy to be good, and therefore
it is recommended that constraints be chosen on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, there
have been several important contributions recommending criteria to determine whether the
matches made are good, chiefly balance (Rubin, 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Stuart et al.,
2013) and aggregate distance between matched units (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013). In this
section we give constraint formulations for some of these popular metrics for both estimands
and estimators introduced above
Starting with aggregate distance, several matching methods work by explicitly minimizing
the sum of distances between matched pairs (Rosenbaum, 1989; Diamond and Sekhon, 2013;
Zubizarreta, 2012). The distance between any two units, dij is defined as some metric
on the covariate space. We might be interested in finding bounds around matches whose
aggregate distance is below some constant L, perhaps one generated by first running any of
the matching algorithms that directly optimize distance, and then using the L arising from
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that algorithm. In this case we should constrain the matches as follows:
in Formulation 1:
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
dijwij ≤ L (15a)
in Formulation 3:
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
dijvij ≤ L
Nt∑
i=1
zi (15b)
in Formulation 4:
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
dijwij ≤ L (15c)
in Formulation 5:
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
dijuij ≤ L · z. (15d)
We might also be interested in imposing a caliper, C, on the distance between two obser-
vations, an upper bound on the maximum distance for which two units are permitted to be
matched. In this case it is easiest to preprocess the data to generate a matrix of auxiliary
variables D in which entry is either 1 or 0 depending on whether the distance between two
units is below the caliper size, and then by requiring wij ≤ Dij for Formulations 1 and 4,
vij ≤ Dijz for Formulation 4, or uij ≤ Dijzi for Formulation 5.
Balance is defined as similarity between the empirical distributions of the covariates in
the treated and control samples (Imai et al., 2008); there have been several suggestions as to
how balance should be assessed and properly measured. Here we give constraint formulations
for assessing similarity between moments of the covariate distributions as well as quantiles.
Starting with moments, constraining the kth moment of the two distributions of the pth
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covariate to be almost σkp apart can be done by requiring:
in Formulation 1:
∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
(xtip)
k − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wij(x
c
jp)
k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σkp (16a)
in Formulation 3:
∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
(xtip)
k −
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
vij(x
c
jp)
k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σkp Nt∑
i=1
zi (16b)
in Formulation 4:
∣∣∣∣ 1M
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wij[(x
t
ip)
k − (xcjp)k]
∣∣∣∣≤ σkp (16c)
in Formulation 5:
∣∣∣∣ Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
uij[(x
t
ip)
k − (xcjp)k]
∣∣∣∣≤ σkp · z. (16d)
Balance can also be ensured by requiring quantiles of the distributions of the covariates
in the two samples to not be too far apart. For the SATT, we can make this process
efficient by employing the suggestion of Zubizarreta (2012) and define, for a covariate p:
Hp = {hp1, . . . , hpk}, a vector of proportions for each quantile of the distribution of p, and
by computing Gtp = {gp1, . . . , gpk}, the covariate quantile values in the treatment group
corresponding to the proportion in set Hp. Then, for all covariates p and quantiles, k we can
require:
in Formulation 1:
∣∣∣∣hpk − 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wijI(xtipc ≤ gpk)
∣∣∣∣≤ p (17a)
in Formulation 3:
∣∣∣∣hpk − 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
vijI(xtipc ≤ gpk)
∣∣∣∣≤ p Nt∑
i=1
zi. (17b)
For the sSATT, we impose quantile balance constraints by introducing a vector of k desired
quantile values for covariate p: Qp = {qp1, . . . , qpk} and create auxiliary variable I(xip ≤ qpk),
which takes value 1 if xip ≤ qpk and 0 otherwise for all treated and untreated observations.
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Then, for all quantiles k of each covariate p we require:
in Formulation 4:
∣∣∣∣ 1M
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wijI(xtip ≤ qpk)−
1
M
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wijI(xtip ≤ qpk)
∣∣∣∣≤ p (17c)
in Formulation 5:
∣∣∣∣ Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
uijI(xtip ≤ qpk)−
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
uijI(xcip ≤ qpk)
∣∣∣∣≤ p · z. (17d)
Finally, we might want to constrain matches to be made exactly on a covariate, p. In order
to do so we create the additional variable I(xip = xjp) and then require, for all treated units
i and control units j: wij ≤ I(xtip = xcip). Here, the decision variable wij can be replaced by
the transformed variable uij to estimate the sSATT with a variable number of units or by vij
to estimate the SATT with multiple matches. All the constraints that have absolute values
in them must be linearized before being included in any integer program formulation. To
do so it is sufficient to separate each constraint into two, letting |aw| ≤ b be any constraint
with an absolute value, it can be replaced by aw ≤ b and −aw ≤ b.
3.4 Practical Guidelines for Using Matching Bounds
In this section, we give practical guidelines for using Matching Bounds as part of common
data analysis pipelines in political science.
In conjunction with another matching method. Matching Bounds can be used as
a robustness check for matches produced by another matching algorithm. Given a desired
matching algorithm, A and a dataset, D, we can run that algorithm on the data to obtain
a match assignment WA. Once that match assignment is obtained, desired match quality
statistics can be computed on the matched data.11 We can then use Matching Bounds to
consider all match assignment of equal or better quality as those produced by A. For example,
11For example, aggregate distance between matches can be computed with LA =
∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1 w
A
ijdij ,
while moment-balance for the kth moment of the pth covariate is computable after running A with: σApk =∣∣∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1 w
A
ij [(x
t
ip)
k − (xcjp)k]
∣∣.
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to calculate match quality for WA, we can plug WA into any of the constraint equations
in Section 3.3 that we would use to define match quality. This gives us the right hand side
for those constraints in Matching Bounds. It is possible that for a matching algorithm A,
multiple runs of A could produce different values of balance or other quality measures. In
this case, we recommend that the algorithm A is run several times and the resulting match
quality values are averaged across runs. This is suggested because Matching Bounds should
account for uncertainty in matching across the various runs of A and not only for a single
run.
We recommend allowing for some tolerance (maybe 5-10%) between the quality level
achieved by A and the quality at which Matching Bounds are computed. Restricting the
bounds to be computed at the exact level of match quality output by A might be misleading:
there could be other matching procedures that output matches of slightly lower but still
admissible quality. By loosening the requirements on how close the bounds have to be to
the quality of the matches made by A, we can ensure that an appropriately large space of
potential admissible matches is considered to produce bounds. The appropriate amount of
tolerance is highly dependent on the problem and the data being analyzed. The hypothetical
question to ask is “how much lower than the quality produced by A would an acceptable
level of match quality be?”, and to use that level to construct Matching Bounds.
To search over hyperparameter values. Matching Bounds can be directly used to
quantify uncertainty due to researcher degrees of freedom by outputting treatment effect
bounds over ranges of potential hyperparameters of a matching procedure. Such hyper-
parameters might include calipers, weight put on covariates to compute balance, or other
metrics of distance between units. To use Matching Bounds in this way, we can constrain
a chosen hyperparameter (or set of hyperparameters) to be within a desired search range
in one of the MIP formulations introduced in this paper, and using differences between
bounds to assess sensitivity of matching to variations in the chosen hyperparameter. It may
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be desirable, in this case, to run Matching Bounds several times, with different ranges for
the hyperparameter being tuned, to get a better picture of discontinuity points and general
impact of the hyperparameter.
Do not rely on Matching Bounds as sensitivity analysis for violations of condi-
tional ignorability. We remark that all the methods presented in the paper are reliant
on Assumption 3 (conditional ignorability), and we caution the reader against relying on
Matching Bounds for measuring unobserved confounding. As Eq. (4) shows, differences in
estimates at similar levels of balance could be due to baseline conditional randomness, or
different ways in which balance is achieved by differentially weighting covariates, as well as
signal from unobservables. The only scenario in which Matching Bounds could indicate an
effect of unobserved covariates is one in which observed covariates are highly predictive of the
outcome, leaving little outcome variance unexplained.12 Even in this case, concluding that
close Matching Bounds implies low sensitivity to confounding could be misleading, especially
if treatment effect estimates are small in magnitude.
Reporting Matching Bounds results. Lastly, there might be concerns on how to re-
port and interpret Matching Bounds in conjunction with other common statistics. Matching
Bounds can be reported alongside other common statistics of the desired treatment effect es-
timate. Overall, Matching Bounds should be used as a robustness check on existing matching
results, in conjunction with theoretically driven justification of the choices of match quality
metrics and values.
12See Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) for sensitivity analysis tools that rely on this setting, in conjunction with
linear outcome models.
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4 Matching and The Effects of Foreign Aid on Intrastate
Conflict
In this section we apply the methods introduced before to a study of the effects of foreign
aid on intrastate conflict conducted by Nielsen et al. (2011). This study employs matching
methods in conjunction with regression to control for observable confounders in the relation-
ship between these two variables. We first replicate the findings of the study and include
Matching Bounds at varying levels of closeness to the match quality achieved by the original
paper. Second, we extend the original analysis by showing that it is possible to use the
paper’s data to produce two sets of good quality matches that lead to opposite treatment
effect estimates.
Nielsen et al. (2011) argue that governments in developing countries can use aid funds to
buy potential rebel groups out of fighting: by offering side payments to these groups, gov-
ernments incur smaller losses than they would by openly fighting them. On the other side,
rebel groups are incentivized by payments not to take up arms, because the risk associated
with fighting is too large compared to the immediate reward of the payment. The paper
suggests that an abrupt and substantial reduction in aid should cause more conflict because
it reduces the funds that governments can employ to prevent rebels from fighting. Following
this logic, their main testable hypothesis is:
H: Aid shocks - severe decreases in development finance revenues - will be associated with
a higher likelihood of armed conflict. (Nielsen et al., 2011, p. 222)
The paper tests this hypothesis by using a rare-events logistic regression on country-
year observations. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if during that year the country
has experienced at least one violent political event and 0 otherwise. A negative aid shock
is measured by first constructing, for each year t, the distribution of change in aid from
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year t to year t + 1 among countries. Countries whose change in aid is in the bottom
15% of this distribution are coded as having received a negative shock to aid during year
t + 1. Following the suggestion of Ho et al. (2007), the paper pre-processes its data with
two matching methods, genetic matching (GM) (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013) and nearest
neighbor propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The observable
covariates they adjust for include several common correlates of intrastate violence and are
reported in Table 1.
Treatment Group Mean Control Group Mean
Violent Conflict 0.076 0.028
Human Rights Violations 2.431 2.199
Political Assassinations 0.132 0.146
Number of Riots 0.280 0.259
Number of Strikes 0.137 0.154
Number of Demonstrations 0.422 0.541
Infant Mortality 78.690 46.161
Bad Intl. Neighborhood 1.076 0.844
Partial Autocracy 0.293 0.188
Partial Democracy 0.219 0.185
Factional Democracy 0.148 0.125
Full Democracy 0.089 0.289
Log GDPPC 7.604 8.606
Log Population 15.376 16.047
Oil Production 0.802 4.617
Instability 0.188 0.121
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.530 0.377
Religious Fractionalization 0.406 0.365
Non Contiguous State 0.036 0.170
Mountain Density 1.745 1.960
Table 1: Matching Covariates from Nielsen et al. All the matches also include a third degree
spline and a proxy for cold war years. More information on all these variables is available in
the supporting materials for Nielsen et al. (2011).
We first replicate the results reported in the paper with both GM and PSM, adding
Matching Bounds computed at progressively lower levels of match quality. We measure
match quality in two ways: First, as the difference in the first three moments of the treated
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and control empirical distributions of each of the matching covariates (Eq. (16a)). Second,
as the sum of distances between matched units. This distance is the absolute difference in
propensity scores for PSM and a modified Mahalanobis distance for GM. This generates
k = {1, 2, 3, 4} match quality constraints. To construct Matching Bounds, we first obtain
σk, the value of constraint k in the original paper, then constrain measure k to be at most
σk away from the level achieved by each of the two matching methods in the original paper.
We report results for several different values of  between 0 and 1.13 The original study
matches each individual treated unit to one control unit with replacement allowed; therefore
we compute Matching Bounds using the SATT estimator and using one-to-one matching
with a fixed number of units (Formulation 4). This yields a sample of 786 treated and
control observations, with all 393 original treated units matched and a matched sample of
393 control units chosen with replacement out of 2234 potential candidates. We obtain
treatment effect estimates on the matched data with a difference-in-means estimator instead
of logistic regression.14
Figure 3 shows results of this replication, together with bounds constructed at different
levels of match quality, represented by . For propensity score matching, we see that, when
matches are constrained to have exactly the same quality as those obtained in the original
study ( = 0), there is no variation between bounds and the original estimates – results are
robust – however, when match quality is lowered by just 0.2σ, we obtain bounds that cross the
0 line, and move progressively more apart from each other as match quality deteriorates. For
genetic matching, we see a very different picture: Matching Bounds are almost unaffected by
lowering the match quality, are always very far apart from each other, and always cross the
zero-line. While the Matching Bounds here do not directly invalidate the original estimates,
they do suggest that estimates obtained with GM may not be robust to choice of matched
13See Section C of the supporting information for a precise formulation of all the optimization problems
solved in this section.
14We reproduce these results using Nielsen et al.’s original logistic regression specification in Section C.2 of
the supporting information. Treatment effect estimates are largely the same as those obtained with difference
in means estimators reported here. Even if the treatment effect obtained in this way is not in the same units
as that reported in the paper, it is generally in the same direction and of the same relative magnitude.
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group, and estimates obtained with PSM may not be robust to violations of strict quality
requirements.15 Finally, Matching Bounds produces different sets of bounds for the two
methods because each method produces matches of different quality, and quality itself is
evaluated differently by each method (L1 loss for PSM and Mahalanobis distance for GM).
This is evidence for one of the primary claims of this paper: that choice of matching method,
distance metric, and other hyperparameters can have a strong impact on resulting estimates.
(a) Propensity Score Matching (b) Genetic Matching
Figure 3: Results from replication of original matches with Matching Bounds. Point esti-
mates are reported with 95% confidence intervals.
We now take advantage of the interpretability of matching to provide an example of
how the phenomenon of equivalent matched groups with different treatment effect estimates
happens. We would like to find matched subsamples in the data that are equivalent in terms
of balance, but produce different treatment effect estimates, and to look precisely at which
units are matched. To address this question, we alter the formulation of the matching bound
problem from the previous replication in two ways: first, we disallow unit replacement so
that each control unit can be used only once. This is done because we would like to identify
separate subgroups within the data. Second, we remove the constraint on the total distance
of matched units, leaving in the three moment balance constraints. We choose to do so
15In their original paper, Nielsen et al. provide additional evidence in favor of their hypothesis without
the use of matching and test additional implications of their broader argument. Here we offer results on the
robustness of only one of the different methods they employ and on only one of the hypotheses they test.
We encourage the reader to take all the empirical evidence provided in the original paper into account when
evaluating the impact of our results on the paper’s overall argument.
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because we would like to use closeness in terms of propensity score as a metric for balance
after matching.16
Figure 4a shows densities of several covariates in the three matched samples generated by
PSM and the corresponding upper and lower Matching Bounds. These include propensity
score balance, which was not explicitly enforced in our optimization problem. The distribu-
tions are very similar in all three cases, and statistically indistinguishable for most of the
matching covariates.17 Nonetheless, while the formulation of the Matching Bounds problem
is not as strict as in the replication exercise, it is reasonable to conclude that both bounds
found here achieve levels of balance that are at least comparable to those achieved by nearest
PSM for most of the control variables. Treatment effect results are displayed in Figure 4b.
(a) Distributions of selected covariates in the con-
trol group matched samples. Matching Bounds
were obtained using balance constraints from
propensity score NN-matching. Balance con-
straints and covariate distributions for genetic
matching are almost identical.
(b) Treatment Effect estimates with nearest
neighbor matching and genetic matching. Match-
ing bounds are included for both algorithms. 95%
confidence intervals are reported around each es-
timate.
Figure 4: Matching Bounds for the effects of aid on conflict with no replacement.
While both nearest neighbor and genetic matching produce similar matches and, therefore,
treatment effect estimates, the Matching Bounds for both algorithms cross the zero line, with
an upper bound of about 0.07 and a lower bound of -0.07. As the figure shows, performing
a hypothesis test with the match assignment on the lower bound would have resulted in a
16A precise formulation of the problem solved here is given in the supporting information.
17Full KS statistic results are available in the supporting information. We note that KS statistics for two
of the matching covariates – infant mortality and gdp per capita – do result in p-values close to 0 for the
matched groups at the bounds, and close to 1 for the NN matched group. This does imply that the matches
made at the bounds are slightly more imbalanced than those made with PSM.
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treatment effect estimate that is negative and statistically significant, whereas the match
assignment on the upper bound results in a statistically significant positive treatment effect.
This implies that there are at least two match assignments that produce the same level of
balance but opposite (and statistically significant) results; these differing results would not be
captured by traditional variance estimators.
To understand why treatment effect estimates obtained at the lower and upper Matching
Bounds are so different, we look at countries that are included in the match assignments for
both bounds but for different years: of 786 control country-years included in the matched
dataset, only 148 differ between bounds, that is 638 observations in the upper and lower
bounds are exactly the same. It is impressive that a large difference in treatment effects can
be obtained by changing less than 19% of the observations between bounds. Of these 148
observations, 92 belong to countries included in both bounds but for different years: these
observations account for much of the variation in conflict outcomes; Table 2 shows countries
included in both bounds for different years and with different conflict outcomes. In the
upper bound’s match assignment, the same country is chosen for peaceful years, while in the
lower bound’s solution, it is chosen for years in which conflict happened. Crucially, the lower
bound years are very close to the upper bound years in each of the countries in Table 2, for
example, Turkey is included in the lower bound for 1984 and in the upper bound for 1981,
with the first year having experienced conflict and the second being peaceful. The number of
conflict events (
∑Nc
i=1 Y
cwij) in the countries included in the lower bound in the table above
is 33, while it is 0 for the same countries in the years they are included in the upper bound
solution. This has an important implication: matching exactly on country, as it is often
recommended, would not remove uncertainty in the equivalently good match assignments.
Focusing on the lower matching bound, the fact that a set of matches can be made in the
same sample, with almost identical balance as that employed by Nielsen et al. (2011), but
producing completely opposite results, suggests that there could be alternative explanations
of the relationship between aid and foreign conflict: governments that suffer negative shocks
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to aid could, for example, choose to divert even more resources to side payments for rebel
groups, as now directly fighting them is even less attractive since their budget has declined.
This would explain a negative treatment effect such as the one found at the lower matching
bound. One possible conclusion that could be drawn from the result reported here is that
the dataset employed in this analysis is not enough to answer the question of whether aid
has an impact on civil conflict. This is because these data could be used to produce matched
samples that produce effects that go in both directions with similar magnitude.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that matching algorithms that perform equally well in terms
of existing metrics can lead to vastly different treatment effects estimates because multiple
matches of similar quality can exist for one unit. We have introduced Matching Bounds, a
method to account for the uncertainty stemming from choice of matched sample. If used
correctly, we believe that this method should mitigate the issue and allow analysts to produce
robust results.
Our results and arguments here are not meant to discourage practitioners from employing
matching methods in any way: matching is a fundamental tool for observational inference
with several desirable properties, such as being nonparametric, and easily interpretable.
Regression adjustment is not a viable alternative to matching because a) it usually imposes
strong parametric assumptions on the outcome model, and b) existing results (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008; Imai and Kim, 2019; Aronow and Samii, 2016) have shown that regression is
in itself a form of weighting, which is itself close to matching, and as such it is not exempt
from any of the problems outlined in this paper.
In an age in which empirical evaluations inform policy more and more, it is fundamental
that the results of the studies that inform policy-making are correct and robust. In that
sense, implications of this study for applied fields such as political economy and development
37
economics are vast: simply, by using Matching Bounds, as opposed to a arbitrary matching
method, results based on data are less likely to be wrong. With Matching Bounds, it will
be possible to obtain inferences that are robust to matching method choice, thus providing
stronger empirical grounds for policy-making and the allocation of development funds.
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A Derivations in Section 2
Here we give a detailed derivation of the quantities in Section 2. We start with a derivation
of the decomposition in (4). Let N ca =
∑Nt
i=1
∑Nc
j=1w
a
ij be the sum of all matches in group a,
and let N bc be the same quantity for match assignment b. All quantities are as defined in the
main paper.
τˆa − τˆ b = 1
Nac
N∑
i=1
Yi(0)(1− Ti)W ai −
1
N bc
N∑
i=1
Yi(0)(1− Ti)wbi
=
1
Nac
N∑
i=1
f0(xi,ui, i)(1− Ti)wai −
1
N bc
N∑
i=1
f0(xi,ui, i)(1− Ti)wbi .
Now take a Taylor expansion of f0(x,u, ) at (0,0, 0). Let ∇f0(0,0, 0) = (β1,β2, β3)T , and
let f0(0,0, 0) = α. We have:
f0(x,u, ) = α + β1
Tx + β2
Tu + β3+ higher order terms.
If we substitute this into the difference we started with we obtain:
τˆa − τˆ b = 1
Nac
N∑
i=1
(α + β1
Txi + β2
Tui + β3i)(1− Ti)W ai
− 1
N bc
N∑
i=1
(α + β1
Txi + β2
Tui + β3i)(1− Ti)wbi
+ difference of higher order terms.
For simplicity, now define x¯a = 1
Nac
∑N
i=1 xi(1− Ti)wai , the average observed covariate values
under match assignment Wa, u¯a = 1
Nac
∑N
i=1 ui(1−Ti)wai , the average unobserved covariates
value under Wa, and ¯a = 1
Nac
∑N
i=1 i(1− Ti)W ai , the average noise under Wa. Let x¯b, u¯b, ¯b
2
be defined analogously for match assignment Wb. We can plug this into the above to obtain:
τˆa − τˆ b = βT1 (x¯a − x¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observables
+βT2 (u¯
a − u¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unobservables
+ β3(¯
a − ¯b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Conditional Variance
+ difference of higher order terms.
To derive the upper bound on ‖¯a − ¯b‖ in Section 2 we can apply the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality to the quantity as follows:
E[‖¯a − ¯b‖] ≤
√
E [(¯a − ¯b)2]
=
√
E[(¯a)2]− 2E[¯a¯b] + E[(¯b)2]
=
√
V ar(¯a) + V ar(¯b)
=
√
V ar(Y¯ a|X,U) + V ar(Y¯ b|X,U),
where the inequality comes from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, first equality from expand-
ing the square, the second from the definition of variance and the fact that E[¯a] = E[¯b] = 0
by assumption. The third equality comes from the definition of Y (0).
B AJPS Replication Methodology
Results are replicated using the original author’s covariate set for matching and model spec-
ification for regression. Since virtually all of the papers replicated in this study make use
of matching in conjunction with regression (Ho et al., 2007) we do the same here. We try
to remain as close to the original author’s preprocessing and post-matching estimation as
possible, changing only which method is used to construct the matches. This means that we
run the same regression models that the authors do after matching. Each paper produces
results using different combinations of either matching covariates, treatment and dependent
variables, or post-matching regression adjustment. We replicate as many of the combinations
3
used by the original authors as possible. Each row in Figures 1 and 2 and in Tables 2 and
3 is one such combination. This explains why there are many different results for a single
paper.
The original results reported by the authors as well as paper titles and references are
willingly omitted from this replication, as the results reported here are not meant to directly
question the findings of the original authors, but, rather to analyze the problem of matching
dependency of results stemming from real-life data and models. Indeed, the authors might
have perfectly good reasons to prefer the matching method they choose to others and to
believe that the results they obtain with that method are the correct ones. The analysis
here should be viewed not much as a replication but more as a simulation on real-life data,
where the data belongs to actual scientific studies and the hypotheses stem from actual
theories, rather than computer simulations.
Table 1 presents a summary of the algorithms used in this replication.18 These specific
algorithms were chosen because they are among those used in the replicated paper and
because, in general, they have been quite popular in applied research across all fields of
political science.
Code Citaton Method Target
No Matching OLS regression Approximate minimization of L2 distance between pairs.
CEM Iacus et al. (2012) Coarsened Exact Matching Upper bound on distance between units.
GenMatch Diamond and Sekhon (2013) Genetic Matching Minimization of loss.
OptMatch Rosenbaum (1989) Optimal Matching Minimization of loss.
Nearest Nearest Neighbor Approximate minimization of loss.
MIP-Match Zubizarreta (2012) Mixed Integer Matching Minimization of loss.
Table 1: Matching methods employed in this replication.
The results from the matching are used as weights in the subsequent regressions: units
with total weights 0 are dropped from the sample, while units with weights greater than 1
are replicated as many times as they are matched. We do not explicitly employ the difference
in means estimator that has been studied in the theoretical section of this paper because we
prioritize fidelity to the original authors methodology and model specification. Replication
18All the algorithms employed here use the same loss: the sum of the Mahalanobis distances between
matched units with no calipers or balance constraints.
4
failed in a few instances: this could be due to either matching problems not being solvable
given covariate specifications or regression models not being estimable. We choose to report
failure in these cases, instead of altering the pool of matching covariates or the statistical
model we choose to estimate.
Balance results are computed using the Cobalt R package. We use standardized absolute
difference between the mean of each covariate in the treated and control group respectively.
Standardization is conducted using the standard deviation of the whole unweighted sample,
as this is a more conservative estimate of matched standard deviation. If this measure of
balance is below a threshold of 0.1, then we consider that covariate balanced, as recommended
by Stuart et al. (2013). Figure 2 and Table 3 report percentages of covariates balanced by
each method.
The dataset used by the original authors in paper number 10 was too large to be used
with some of the matching methods tested (GenMatch, OptMatch, Mip-Match). For this
reason, we take a random sample of the observations (N=2000, roughly 10% of the original
datasets) from the data to perform our tests.
B.1 Numeric versions of Figures 1 and 2
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C Nielsen et al. Replication: Additional Information.
We structure all our replication along the code and data file kindly provided by Nielsen et
al. We use the author’s original R code to perform matching using both p-score nearest
neighbor and genetic matching.
To compute Matching Bounds for the replication exercise we start from the matches
obtained with genetic matching WGM and pscore NN-matching WPSM and derive values
for the balance constraints for the first three moments of the covariate distributions of the
control group. To compute Matching Bounds we solve the following mixed-integer program,
for A ∈ {GM,PS}:
min/max τˆ t = y¯t − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
yciwij
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wij = N
t,
∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[xtip − xcjp]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σAp1, p = 1, . . . , P∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[(xtip)
2 − (xcjp)2]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σAp2, p = 1, . . . , P∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[(xtip)
3 − (xcjp)3]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σAp2, p = 1, . . . , P
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
wijd
A
ij ≤ σA4 .
We obtain W+A by solving the maximization problem and W
−
A by solving the minimization
problem. Once the Matching Bounds are obtained we compute the corresponding TE esti-
8
mates by using the SATT estimator defined in (2) with each set of weights respectively. The
results of this computation are those reported in Figure 4b.
The second optimization problem we solve is to generate results in Figures 4a and 4b.
The full formulation is as follows:
min/max τˆ t = y¯t − 1
N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
yciwij
subject to: wij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N t, j = 1, . . . , N c
Nc∑
j=1
wij = 1, i = 1, . . . , N
t
Nt∑
i=1
wij ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , N c
∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[xtip − xcjp]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σPSMp1 , p = 1, . . . , P∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[(xtip)
2 − (xcjp)2]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σPSMp2 , p = 1, . . . , P∣∣∣∣ 1N t
Nt∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
[(xtip)
3 − (xcjp)3]wij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ σPSMp2 , p = 1, . . . , P
We constrain the matches with covariate balance levels obtained by running propensity
score matching with Nielsen et al.’s original specification. To find optimal matches for
both programs we optimized a linearly relaxed version of the the problem, where matching
indicators wij are real numbers between 0 and 1. Optimal values are then rounded up or down
depending on whether they are greater or less than 0.5. Constraints are slightly violated
due to this, but resulting groups are still balanced. Estimates obtained when fractional
weights that are fully compliant with the constraints are used are essentially the same as
9
those obtained when weights are rounded to make integer matches.
C.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Equality Between Covariate
Distributions
We also computed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics to make sure that the distributions of
matching covariates were not statistically distinguishable from the distribution of matching
covariates in the treatment group at both Matching Bounds and algorithms: results are
displayed in Table 4.
Pscore Upper Bound Lower Bound
KS Statistic p-value KS Statistic p-value KS Statistic p-value
Human Rights Violations 0.051 0.689 0.046 0.804 0.038 0.937
Political Assassinations 0.008 1 0.018 1.000 0.013 1
Number of Riots 0.038 0.937 0.008 1 0.015 1
Number of Strikes 0.018 1.000 0.056 0.569 0.046 0.804
Number of Demonstrations 0.048 0.748 0.074 0.235 0.069 0.312
Infant Mortality 0.046 0.804 0.132 0.002 0.122 0.006
Bad Neighborhood 0.041 0.901 0.018 1.000 0.013 1
Partial Autocracy 0.008 1 0.115 0.012 0.023 1.000
Partial Democracy 0.008 1 0.015 1 0.005 1
Factional Democracy 0.025 1.000 0.010 1 0.008 1
Full Democracy 0.031 0.993 0.010 1 0.018 1.000
Log GDPPC 0.048 0.748 0.122 0.006 0.150 0.0003
Log Population 0.056 0.569 0.038 0.937 0.066 0.356
Oil Production 0.048 0.748 0.041 0.901 0.048 0.748
Instability 0.018 1.000 0.043 0.856 0.033 0.983
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.048 0.748 0.089 0.089 0.061 0.456
Relibious Fractionalization 0.064 0.404 0.056 0.569 0.071 0.271
Non Contiguous 0.003 1 0.010 1 0.025 1.000
Mountain density 0.051 0.689 0.043 0.856 0.041 0.901
Post Cold War 0.033 0.983 0.033 0.983 0.025 1.000
Spline 1 0.056 0.569 0.031 0.993 0.061 0.456
Spline 2 0.056 0.569 0.031 0.993 0.061 0.456
Spline 3 0.056 0.569 0.031 0.993 0.061 0.456
Table 4: KS test of difference between treatment and matchd control sample distributions
for matching covariates employed in Figure 4b
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C.2 Results With Nielsen et al.’s original model.
We re-estimate treatment effects reported in Figures 3a and 3b of Section 4 using the au-
thor’s original rare event logistic regression specification estimated at the Matching Bounds
corresponding to NN-Pscore matching and Genetic Matching. Matching covariates are in-
cluded in all the regressions. Results are displayed in Table 5. Effects at the upper bounds
could not be estimated due to the fact that the upper bound solution was a matched control
group with no occurrences of conflict (Y = 0) for all control units, which makes treatment
a perfect predictor of the outcome in this case (Pr(Y = 1|T = 0) = 0), and violates the
requirements for estimation of a logistic regression model. Overall, effects obtained with
regression after matching are similar to those obtained with differences in means. This is
in line with the predictions of the behavior of regression after matching found in Ho et al.
(2007).
 LB Estimate Std. Error Z UB Estimate Std Error Z
PSM
0.0 0.91 0.45 2.04 0.91 0.45 2.04
0.2 -1.63 0.30 -5.38 Inf NA NA
0.4 -2.11 0.30 -6.99 Inf NA NA
0.6 -2.29 0.30 -7.64 Inf NA NA
0.9 -2.46 0.30 -8.26 Inf NA NA
1.0 -2.58 0.30 -8.64 Inf NA NA
GM
0.0 -7.66 0.66 -11.66 Inf NA NA
0.2 -8.19 0.73 -11.19 Inf NA NA
0.4 -8.15 0.72 -11.37 Inf NA NA
0.6 -9.21 1.07 -8.64 Inf NA NA
0.8 -8.59 0.86 -10.03 Inf NA NA
1.0 -9.53 1.18 -8.06 Inf NA NA
Table 5: Effects of aid shocks on violent conflict estimated as coefficient of a logistic regression
on the matched data at the bounds. For each value of  sets of matched control units that
achieve balance within  of either the balance achieved by PSM or GM are used as described
in Section 4. Matching covariates are included in each regression, with an indicator for the
treatment (aid shock). Upper bound treatment effects and relative standard errors and Z-
tests could not be estimated with regression because outcome perfectly separates treatment
groups at the upper bound matches.
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